(Subject to updates and revisions)
Spain
2008 European Championships: WINNERS
2010 World Cup: WINNERS
2012 European Championships: WINNERS
Analysis - Spain's majestic brilliance floors their critics; hype and skewed perspectives widespread.
A decent summation and one which made Spain's Olympic results (no goals and no win in three matches) extraordinary. Interesting nonetheless is the reaction of 'senior' players Jordi Alba and Juan Mata who were clearly hurt by their team's inability to succeed and went on to have outstanding seasons for their clubs, Barcelona and Chelsea respectively. (Juan Mata would score or assist 49 goals from 64 Chelsea appearances in their 2012-13 season, further underlining the significance of his substitute role in the Spanish squad to date.)
Germany 0 - 1 Spain
Holland 0 - 1 Spain
Spain 4 - 0 Italy
1-0: Fabregas to Silva
2-0: Xavi to Alba
3-0: Xavi to Torres
4-0: Torres to Mata
Spain (v Italy 4-0) (stated ages are for Brazil in 2014; 30+ only)
01 Casillas (2014)
03 Pique (2014)
15 Ramos (2014
17 Arbeloa (2014) 31
18 Alba (2014)
06 Iniesta (2014) 30
08 Xavi (2014) 34
10 Fabregas (2014)
14 Alonso (2014) 32
16 Busquets (2014)
21 Silva (2014)
Substitutes
12 Valdes - Barcelona
23 Reina - Napoli
02 Albiol - Real Madrid
04 Martinez - Bayern Munich
05 Juanfran - Athletico Madrid
20 Cazorla - Arsenal
22 Navas - Manchester City
07 Pedrito - Barcelona
09 Torres - Chelsea
11 Negredo - Manchester City
13 Mata - Chelsea
19 Llorente - Juventus
11 - Del Bosque could if he wished field the exact same team in Brazil. Continuity.
Additional players for Brazil 2014
Cristian Tello - Barcelona (Winger/attacker)
Nacho Monreal - Arsenal (Fullback)
Cesar Azpilicueta - Chelsea (Fullback)
Cesar Azpilicueta - Chelsea (Fullback)
Isco - Malaga (Midfield)
Alvaro Dominguez - Borussia Monchengladbach (Central defender)
Alvaro Morata - Real Madrid (Striker)
GENERAL
The physicality and mentality of the Spanish National team has been phenomenal; there is no sign of this wavering. Much has been made of Spain's extraordinary commitment to ball retention and the art of passing but those very principles are dependent on the physical and mental attributes to achieve them to the devastating extent they did against Italy in their latest performance in a major tournament. As I pointed to elsewhere Spain's destruction of Ireland en route to that final was simply breathtaking and of a kind unparalleled in recent times; that they went on to do the same to a much heralded Italian team in the Final was no surprise. That performance justifiably burst the dam of praise and superlatives and given the trickery of the human mind it is worth recalling those accolades as a means of ascertaining just how far ahead of their European rivals Spain actually are, having also outplayed Holland in South Africa at the previous World Cup.
The basic Opta Stats from Euro 2012 tell a simple story of dominance in every aspect. Spain's approach is often crudely reduced to two competing tendencies, as if the brilliance of their forward play is 'actually' subsumed by their insatiable apetite to keep the ball out of their own net: even Arsene Wenger became a little riled by it. As many have correctly pointed out, the Spanish players know exactly what they are doing and why they are doing it and their belief in that philosophy has produced the kind of performances that mean no opponent has scored a goal against them at any time in the knockout phases of the last three major tournaments, a fact that loses none of its incredibility with repetition (Zinedine Zidane was the last player to do so, in 2006). The mental desire and hunger that such a process underscores is of a kind that no other nation will produce in a very long time. And really the term process is the key to understanding Spain's mental and physical hunger in their quest for total superiority at all times. La Roja have invested everything into the concept of flow and process since before their tidal wave of domination began in 2008: a vision was implemented and trained for religiously not just to win a tournament or improve the competitiveness of their football clubs. As Cesc Febregas pinpointed: "People who think we are boring don't understand the game". Another more comparative way of looking at that vision is to point out that the current World Cup 2014 favourites and hosts Brazil have been defined by their manager Luis Felipe Scolari as lacking in the very philosophical precision that has put Spain out of reach of their opponents for so long: "What is missing is a full definition of how to play" he said recently. In that sense, they are only six or seven years behind Spain.
Analytically what is important is the level of distortion that can occur when making predictions relating to tournament outcomes. Football can be a volatile sport with shocks, surprises and unknowable drama but nonetheless all that does not happen without some kind of order: a team's development through a tournament or disintegration from it almost always has a certain kind of structure defined by the relationship between the usual core aspects: player quality, manager quality, tactical proficiency and balance, team togetherness, team hunger, individual brilliance, team physicality, depth of squad and so on.
In preliminary terms a generally skewed perspective is still strongly evident if looking at the odds of reward from the bookmaking industry as an example. Spain are generally third favourites, despite being one of the most gifted sides ever. They are only marginally positioned as being ahead of Germany despite the evidence of the 2012 European Championships demonstrating that the gap between them is actually quite large. The clear inference is that Spain are unlikely to be as effective in 2014 as they were in 2010 regardless of the evidence either side of South Africa.
Seven current players (Puyol not included) played in the 3-1 defeat to France in the 2006 World Cup. That seven to eight year period reveals the full extent of the philosophical and scientific training programme implemented by the Real Federación Española de Fútbol - there is a team of individuals but no single individual defines the team. The waves of players Spain produced (and continue to produce) were of a particular kind, of course, but whatever their natural ability they were channeled and directed into an unwavering and uncompromising style of play born from a realisation that "they weren't physical and tough enough to outmuscle opponents, so instead wanted to concentrate on monopolising the ball." The full ethos and impact of tiki-taka can be digested in detail elsewhere: here we are concerned with its continued efficacy at the World Cup Finals in Brazil 2014. Team assessments can be based on the structural components outlined higher up, in short they comprise:
Leaving aside the erroneous title of the video, this goal in particular captures the almost tortuous mental pressure that is exerted on teams by Spain. In terms of technique and physicality there is nothing that is impressive about either the phase of play overall or the strike at goal. Given that this phase of play occurs in the first ten minutes of the match their opponents are clearly not fatigued in any way but the desire to pass, move and retain possession exhausts their opponents within the possession phase itself, resulting in a strike at goal from close range which is successful. For 25 passes Spain work the ball across the pitch, slightly forward and slightly back until an isolated but determined press on Jordi Alba leads to Spain retreating all the way back to their goalkeeper who recycles the ball as the 26th pass. In that first wave the Scottish players are tactically precise and mentally alert: they press, drop-off and follow the movement of their opponents without allowing space behind their back-line. They press zones once the ball is moved toward it retaining all key positions behind the ball in adjacent areas of the pitch and they follow runners early in their movement, often preventing a more penetrating pass. By around the 35th pass Spain are still only on the halfway line but what has gone before now starts to exert an extraordinary mental pressure on their opponents who, having not touched the ball for around a minute and a half, begin to lose their mental alertness and discipline.
Passes 36 and 37 (roughly) are unremarkable but they lead directly to the goal because the Scotland players are mentally fatigued from the preceding passage of play in its entirety. The continual repositioning and running without the ball owing to the hypnotic and constant movement of the ball by Spain induces tactical defensive errors which then allow the space for Spain to penetrate with sudden speed and intensity. The simple exchange between Xavi and Silva causes three of the Scottish players to crumple around one another. As they are now fatigued all three players allow Silva to make off untracked despite in the first instance all three being close enough to him to reach out and touch him. Earlier within the same phase a player would have run with Silva, checking him. The additional space then allows Xavi to play a longer, deeper pass to the wing which turns Jordi Alba's marker - the player who had initially pressed Alba successfully has now had his body position turned to face his own goal by Xavi's pass. As such he is no longer in the right position nor mentally alert enough to respond to the extended underlapping run made by Alba, which allows the cross to find Silva who long ago left the three opposing players that switched off to find space and score. Part of Alba's run is made by the fact that his marker also has in his mind that the ball will be recycled infield yet again, much like it was five or six times previously within the same move (when Scotland's positioning and alertness was much sharper). When he realises Spain have gone for the kill it is too late. Had his starting position been better he would have faced Alba's run and blocked it but he was ball-watching the exchange between Xavi and Silva, in effect meaning four opposing players switched off mentally during a simple passing sequence. Spain retained possession until deciding they could score. A similar scenario is showcased below, this time Fabregas denotes the decisive zone with Silva again the beneficiary:
Defensive positional concentration, fatigue and error is not something that is often mentioned when talking of Spain's opponents but it is often the most decisive effect of Spain's style. The other is more obvious: physical pressure. In the latter parts of games, particularly those in which the scoreline is still even or close to it, Spain's retention of possession forces tiring opponents to retreat deeper. As opponents without the ball for the majority of the match the mental and physical willingness to press higher up the pitch can fade away in a lot of teams: it is easier in theory to sit deeper and press shorter distances to advancing players or passes, with a deep line also ensuring no space in behind for penetrating passes (Italy in particular paid a heavy price for being too open/fatigued in their Final encounter). This is the problem that Spain encounter most often therefore. Their control and dominance of the ball often entails prolonged spells where openings do not necessarily emerge and desirable shots on goal are not possible owing to resolute defensive work from their opponents and/or incomplete passing sequences by Spain themselves. However, in pinning their opponents deeper when in possession in later stages of matches Spain are effectively nullifying the attacking threat of their opponents: even if opponents win the ball back they are a) often more fatigued than normal due to less ball possession and more chasing and repositioning work; b) further from Spain's goal due to retreating deeper towards their own leaving it much more difficult to c) counter-attack quickly from such a deep position, not least because under normal circumstances Spain's own defensive pressure on the ball is extremely quick and effective. This is one reason why teams have found it incredibly difficult to score against Spain in key matches where Spain's intensity is high, because opponents cannot easily retrieve the ball nor facilitate periods of transitional play against them. The idea of using speed against Spain once they have lost possession is fine in theory but it leads to longer, often inaccurate passes which when unsuccessful simply returns the ball to Spain allowing them to begin their sustained possession build-up once again.
Tournament structure compounds the effects of both mental and physical fatigue. As the number of games increase so does the likelihood of increased tiredness on a general level. By contrast at the start of a tournament levels of physical sharpness and mental alertness are high, as is the attention on any tactical plans instilled in the players in an attempt to make the best possible start. What in 2010 and 2012 appeared to be 'sluggish' starts by Spain were actually fairly normal representations of their ability. Against Switzerland in their World Cup opener they lost 1-0 having had 67% possession and 22 attempts on goal to their opponents 6, forcing 12 corners to the Swiss's 3. Against Italy at the Euros they drew 1-1 with Spain enjoying two thirds of the possession and 14 attempts on goal to Italy's 9, with Spain forcing five more corners than the team they would later crush in the final. In reality, at the start of tournaments, Spain's approach has an air of vulnerability: they are not yet fully tuned but their opponents are straining to match their every move and have the physical and mental freshness to attempt to do so. Spain still dominated their opening matches but their opponents were capable of causing them sufficient problems to score a goal, in the case of Switzerland decisively so.
As the tournament wears on however that freshness is eroded. Whilst that simple law of nature does not automatically translate into goals for Spain it does begin to tilt the balance of matches more heavily in their favour: as players and team structures become just a fraction jaded, Spain's retention of possession and their ability to rest with the ball during matches allows them to hone their precision and intensity whilst inflicting further fatigue on their opponents. Nonetheless matches such as the 0-0 with Portugal in the Semi-Final of the latest European Championships attest to the danger inherent in not scoring more freely: as discussed lower down Spain are in fact susceptible to a late moment of genius or error and to the volatile possibilities that shadow penalty shoot-outs. Three consecutive tournament victories suggests that as yet that susceptibility is not decisive.
Having previously stated that he would end his reign as manager of La Roja after Brazil, Vincente Del Bosque has more recently clouded the issue by suggesting discussions on his future could wait until after his team's defence of their World Cup title. The issue will no doubt be resolved more fully either way prior to the tournament commencing in Brazil. Before then Del Bosque will oversee Spain's Confederations Cup campaign in Brazil, ensuring continued managerial stability to the side.
Beating Spain
The physicality and mentality of the Spanish National team has been phenomenal; there is no sign of this wavering. Much has been made of Spain's extraordinary commitment to ball retention and the art of passing but those very principles are dependent on the physical and mental attributes to achieve them to the devastating extent they did against Italy in their latest performance in a major tournament. As I pointed to elsewhere Spain's destruction of Ireland en route to that final was simply breathtaking and of a kind unparalleled in recent times; that they went on to do the same to a much heralded Italian team in the Final was no surprise. That performance justifiably burst the dam of praise and superlatives and given the trickery of the human mind it is worth recalling those accolades as a means of ascertaining just how far ahead of their European rivals Spain actually are, having also outplayed Holland in South Africa at the previous World Cup.
The basic Opta Stats from Euro 2012 tell a simple story of dominance in every aspect. Spain's approach is often crudely reduced to two competing tendencies, as if the brilliance of their forward play is 'actually' subsumed by their insatiable apetite to keep the ball out of their own net: even Arsene Wenger became a little riled by it. As many have correctly pointed out, the Spanish players know exactly what they are doing and why they are doing it and their belief in that philosophy has produced the kind of performances that mean no opponent has scored a goal against them at any time in the knockout phases of the last three major tournaments, a fact that loses none of its incredibility with repetition (Zinedine Zidane was the last player to do so, in 2006). The mental desire and hunger that such a process underscores is of a kind that no other nation will produce in a very long time. And really the term process is the key to understanding Spain's mental and physical hunger in their quest for total superiority at all times. La Roja have invested everything into the concept of flow and process since before their tidal wave of domination began in 2008: a vision was implemented and trained for religiously not just to win a tournament or improve the competitiveness of their football clubs. As Cesc Febregas pinpointed: "People who think we are boring don't understand the game". Another more comparative way of looking at that vision is to point out that the current World Cup 2014 favourites and hosts Brazil have been defined by their manager Luis Felipe Scolari as lacking in the very philosophical precision that has put Spain out of reach of their opponents for so long: "What is missing is a full definition of how to play" he said recently. In that sense, they are only six or seven years behind Spain.
Analytically what is important is the level of distortion that can occur when making predictions relating to tournament outcomes. Football can be a volatile sport with shocks, surprises and unknowable drama but nonetheless all that does not happen without some kind of order: a team's development through a tournament or disintegration from it almost always has a certain kind of structure defined by the relationship between the usual core aspects: player quality, manager quality, tactical proficiency and balance, team togetherness, team hunger, individual brilliance, team physicality, depth of squad and so on.
In preliminary terms a generally skewed perspective is still strongly evident if looking at the odds of reward from the bookmaking industry as an example. Spain are generally third favourites, despite being one of the most gifted sides ever. They are only marginally positioned as being ahead of Germany despite the evidence of the 2012 European Championships demonstrating that the gap between them is actually quite large. The clear inference is that Spain are unlikely to be as effective in 2014 as they were in 2010 regardless of the evidence either side of South Africa.
Seven current players (Puyol not included) played in the 3-1 defeat to France in the 2006 World Cup. That seven to eight year period reveals the full extent of the philosophical and scientific training programme implemented by the Real Federación Española de Fútbol - there is a team of individuals but no single individual defines the team. The waves of players Spain produced (and continue to produce) were of a particular kind, of course, but whatever their natural ability they were channeled and directed into an unwavering and uncompromising style of play born from a realisation that "they weren't physical and tough enough to outmuscle opponents, so instead wanted to concentrate on monopolising the ball." The full ethos and impact of tiki-taka can be digested in detail elsewhere: here we are concerned with its continued efficacy at the World Cup Finals in Brazil 2014. Team assessments can be based on the structural components outlined higher up, in short they comprise:
- Team Selection: consistency and depth
- Philosophical and Managerial: tactical strengths and weaknesses
- Playing Evidence: improvements and alterations in performance since South Africa (2010)
Tiki-Taka; Positional Concentration, Fatigue and Error;
Tournament Structure and Managerial Stability.
Leaving aside the erroneous title of the video, this goal in particular captures the almost tortuous mental pressure that is exerted on teams by Spain. In terms of technique and physicality there is nothing that is impressive about either the phase of play overall or the strike at goal. Given that this phase of play occurs in the first ten minutes of the match their opponents are clearly not fatigued in any way but the desire to pass, move and retain possession exhausts their opponents within the possession phase itself, resulting in a strike at goal from close range which is successful. For 25 passes Spain work the ball across the pitch, slightly forward and slightly back until an isolated but determined press on Jordi Alba leads to Spain retreating all the way back to their goalkeeper who recycles the ball as the 26th pass. In that first wave the Scottish players are tactically precise and mentally alert: they press, drop-off and follow the movement of their opponents without allowing space behind their back-line. They press zones once the ball is moved toward it retaining all key positions behind the ball in adjacent areas of the pitch and they follow runners early in their movement, often preventing a more penetrating pass. By around the 35th pass Spain are still only on the halfway line but what has gone before now starts to exert an extraordinary mental pressure on their opponents who, having not touched the ball for around a minute and a half, begin to lose their mental alertness and discipline.
Passes 36 and 37 (roughly) are unremarkable but they lead directly to the goal because the Scotland players are mentally fatigued from the preceding passage of play in its entirety. The continual repositioning and running without the ball owing to the hypnotic and constant movement of the ball by Spain induces tactical defensive errors which then allow the space for Spain to penetrate with sudden speed and intensity. The simple exchange between Xavi and Silva causes three of the Scottish players to crumple around one another. As they are now fatigued all three players allow Silva to make off untracked despite in the first instance all three being close enough to him to reach out and touch him. Earlier within the same phase a player would have run with Silva, checking him. The additional space then allows Xavi to play a longer, deeper pass to the wing which turns Jordi Alba's marker - the player who had initially pressed Alba successfully has now had his body position turned to face his own goal by Xavi's pass. As such he is no longer in the right position nor mentally alert enough to respond to the extended underlapping run made by Alba, which allows the cross to find Silva who long ago left the three opposing players that switched off to find space and score. Part of Alba's run is made by the fact that his marker also has in his mind that the ball will be recycled infield yet again, much like it was five or six times previously within the same move (when Scotland's positioning and alertness was much sharper). When he realises Spain have gone for the kill it is too late. Had his starting position been better he would have faced Alba's run and blocked it but he was ball-watching the exchange between Xavi and Silva, in effect meaning four opposing players switched off mentally during a simple passing sequence. Spain retained possession until deciding they could score. A similar scenario is showcased below, this time Fabregas denotes the decisive zone with Silva again the beneficiary:
Defensive positional concentration, fatigue and error is not something that is often mentioned when talking of Spain's opponents but it is often the most decisive effect of Spain's style. The other is more obvious: physical pressure. In the latter parts of games, particularly those in which the scoreline is still even or close to it, Spain's retention of possession forces tiring opponents to retreat deeper. As opponents without the ball for the majority of the match the mental and physical willingness to press higher up the pitch can fade away in a lot of teams: it is easier in theory to sit deeper and press shorter distances to advancing players or passes, with a deep line also ensuring no space in behind for penetrating passes (Italy in particular paid a heavy price for being too open/fatigued in their Final encounter). This is the problem that Spain encounter most often therefore. Their control and dominance of the ball often entails prolonged spells where openings do not necessarily emerge and desirable shots on goal are not possible owing to resolute defensive work from their opponents and/or incomplete passing sequences by Spain themselves. However, in pinning their opponents deeper when in possession in later stages of matches Spain are effectively nullifying the attacking threat of their opponents: even if opponents win the ball back they are a) often more fatigued than normal due to less ball possession and more chasing and repositioning work; b) further from Spain's goal due to retreating deeper towards their own leaving it much more difficult to c) counter-attack quickly from such a deep position, not least because under normal circumstances Spain's own defensive pressure on the ball is extremely quick and effective. This is one reason why teams have found it incredibly difficult to score against Spain in key matches where Spain's intensity is high, because opponents cannot easily retrieve the ball nor facilitate periods of transitional play against them. The idea of using speed against Spain once they have lost possession is fine in theory but it leads to longer, often inaccurate passes which when unsuccessful simply returns the ball to Spain allowing them to begin their sustained possession build-up once again.
Tournament structure compounds the effects of both mental and physical fatigue. As the number of games increase so does the likelihood of increased tiredness on a general level. By contrast at the start of a tournament levels of physical sharpness and mental alertness are high, as is the attention on any tactical plans instilled in the players in an attempt to make the best possible start. What in 2010 and 2012 appeared to be 'sluggish' starts by Spain were actually fairly normal representations of their ability. Against Switzerland in their World Cup opener they lost 1-0 having had 67% possession and 22 attempts on goal to their opponents 6, forcing 12 corners to the Swiss's 3. Against Italy at the Euros they drew 1-1 with Spain enjoying two thirds of the possession and 14 attempts on goal to Italy's 9, with Spain forcing five more corners than the team they would later crush in the final. In reality, at the start of tournaments, Spain's approach has an air of vulnerability: they are not yet fully tuned but their opponents are straining to match their every move and have the physical and mental freshness to attempt to do so. Spain still dominated their opening matches but their opponents were capable of causing them sufficient problems to score a goal, in the case of Switzerland decisively so.
As the tournament wears on however that freshness is eroded. Whilst that simple law of nature does not automatically translate into goals for Spain it does begin to tilt the balance of matches more heavily in their favour: as players and team structures become just a fraction jaded, Spain's retention of possession and their ability to rest with the ball during matches allows them to hone their precision and intensity whilst inflicting further fatigue on their opponents. Nonetheless matches such as the 0-0 with Portugal in the Semi-Final of the latest European Championships attest to the danger inherent in not scoring more freely: as discussed lower down Spain are in fact susceptible to a late moment of genius or error and to the volatile possibilities that shadow penalty shoot-outs. Three consecutive tournament victories suggests that as yet that susceptibility is not decisive.
Having previously stated that he would end his reign as manager of La Roja after Brazil, Vincente Del Bosque has more recently clouded the issue by suggesting discussions on his future could wait until after his team's defence of their World Cup title. The issue will no doubt be resolved more fully either way prior to the tournament commencing in Brazil. Before then Del Bosque will oversee Spain's Confederations Cup campaign in Brazil, ensuring continued managerial stability to the side.
Beating Spain
There is no particular secret or model to out-pointing one of the best footballing sides in history but in 2010 Switzerland most likely came closest to outlining it in a basic way. In that opening match the Swiss continually banked Spain inland, cutting off the widest, deeper zones and then committing to running hard along horizontal lines with defensive central zoning allied to a direct and central counter attack. None of that is original and it happens quite a lot in games featuring Spain. The goal scored by the Swiss was fairly erratic in conception and finish but they also hit the post from a similarly penetrative counter through the central zones, giving Spain little time to regroup. As pointed to above regarding opening matches, Switzerland were physically and mentally at their most alert, their most dynamic. When that physicality, alertness and dynamism fades then the residual class of a team is often laid bare: Switzerland failed to qualify or score a goal from their next two games, losing 1-0 to Chile and drawing 0-0 with Honduras.
Rising in class, Italy decided on a similar idea by deploying a 3-5-2 formation in their opening match of Euro 2012. It is fair to say that the individual speed of Spain's wide wing play may not be the biggest concern of opposing teams but having the intent to prevent them from entering those spaces easily has in the past proved crucial. Opposing teams do no want to see players such as Andres Iniesta, David Silva, Pedro and Juan Mata in those zones as when they are it can be difficult to stop them creating goalscoring chances, so the desire to bank them inland is important. The Final showed the difference in residual class between these teams so again it can be seen how fresher, sharper minds and bodies are able to create more problems for Spain early on in tournaments (most notably after La Roja finally banished their tournament ghost, where their own hunger to do so saw them win all three group games at Euro 2008, hammering Russia in the first of them but also conceding one goal in every game). With their formation and understanding of it Italy were able to compress Spain between the lines and press them higher, dominating the wider zones and crowding the central zones with pressure. They were helped on this occasion by Spain's lack of desire to run hard and fast into deeper zones in the first half, something which they altered in the second period. Iniesta perhaps should have scored and Fabregas did.
The problem analytically regards the later stages of tournaments. As Spain haven't conceded a goal in those phases in three tournaments spanning four years the threats probably lie outside of Europe. In 2010 Spain played against a number of South American teams but none of them were particularly strong: Honduras, Chile and Paraguay. However La Roja have yet to be tested by an array of world class forwards operating in a tactically efficient team that is capable of retaining possession for sustained periods. Cristiano Ronaldo has been effectively nullified in previous meetings with Portugal and a struggling Uruguay were swept aside in a February friendly featuring Luis Suarez and Edison Cavani. Argentina on the other hand increasingly have the potential for a highly effective defensive midfield barrier (Mascherano & Gago/Banega) together with a fluid, elite level attacking threat that can combine effectively during established patterns of play; whilst in Lionel Messi they also have the potential for individual flashes of brilliance in front of goal (assuming he is supported by a realistic tactical structure, not forthcoming under Maradona). Pastore, Lavezzi, Di Maria, Higuain, Aguero, Tevez: players that offer attacking depth and rotation. Argentina have suffered just the one surprise defeat in qualifying (away at Venezuela) and were recently held to a draw away at Bolivia: as a team they are not near Spain's level - defensively they are nowhere near as strong - but there won't be a better team at the World Cup than La Roja; to conquer them will require elite class firepower and the tactical, mental and physical ability to unleash it and in that respect Argentina offer the clearest threat to Spain, more detail on which will come on Argentina's page.
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