GERMANY
2008 European Championships: Runners-up
2010 World Cup: Third
2012 European Championships: Semi-finalists
PLATEAU
There are two European countries that have recently 'revolutionised' their philosophy and approach to International tournament football. One of them became all-conquering, theoretically unbeatable. Germany on the other hand have struggled to complete their transformation, remaining in the shadow of La Roja and lately, more worryingly, the Azzuri.
Euro 2012
Germany have played some of the most open and attacking football on the International stage in recent times and been involved quite regularly in high scoring games; without doubt this commitment has seen Germany become many people's 'adopted' team: their ambitious and physically explosive approach is closely matched with the most exciting league football in Europe, incorporating elements of the English Premier League, La Liga and, naturally, the Bundesliga. The key difference with La Roja lies in the structure of their respective revolutions: Germany opted for a comprehensive investment in revolutionising and promoting individual style and talent; Spain opted for a monopolisation of the football in its totality which whilst including individual style and talent also incorporates by definition tactical supremacy in tandem with defensive structure and solidity. Germany's philosophy is therefore less all-embracing; it is more about maximising individual performances within a fairly narrow system of play. It is the reason they have struggled against very different and highly fluent European systems of play at elite tournament level.
Prior to dismantling a fragmented Argentina 4-0 in South Africa, Germany's manager Joachim Low had pointed to this difference when saying that: "My players have to fulfil tasks. They have to be disciplined in their play. There is no straitjacket I impose on them but they have to work on the pitch within my tactics. They can't just do what they want. We have to be faithful to a particular tactical play but they've bought into it and it's been working".
What this induces is a form of psychological tension. Against inferior and/or less organised and less dynamic teams Germany move and score quite freely, they are confident in their system of play and each other; in these games they are confident of victory, of their own superiority, even if conceding goals in the match. At elite international level their superiority is less assured. When playing Spain it is removed. Even against Italy Miroslav Klose commented after the game that: "The hurdle of Italy was too high. Perhaps the fact that we had never beaten them was in the back of our minds." Against supremely organised sides in big games the German model crashes to an extent. In the Final of Euro 2008 against Spain Germany didn't score; against Spain in the semi-final of the World Cup 2010 Germany didn't score; and against Italy in the semi-final of Euro 2012 Germany were 2-0 down in the 90th minute, scoring only from a penalty kick in the last minute. That is a near-shocking return for an international team widely and repeatedly feted as the 'most exciting' and, as in 2012, the 'likeliest winners' of a tournament. Not in any way their fault, they will be feted again before kick-off in Brazil.
What this induces is a form of psychological tension. Against inferior and/or less organised and less dynamic teams Germany move and score quite freely, they are confident in their system of play and each other; in these games they are confident of victory, of their own superiority, even if conceding goals in the match. At elite international level their superiority is less assured. When playing Spain it is removed. Even against Italy Miroslav Klose commented after the game that: "The hurdle of Italy was too high. Perhaps the fact that we had never beaten them was in the back of our minds." Against supremely organised sides in big games the German model crashes to an extent. In the Final of Euro 2008 against Spain Germany didn't score; against Spain in the semi-final of the World Cup 2010 Germany didn't score; and against Italy in the semi-final of Euro 2012 Germany were 2-0 down in the 90th minute, scoring only from a penalty kick in the last minute. That is a near-shocking return for an international team widely and repeatedly feted as the 'most exciting' and, as in 2012, the 'likeliest winners' of a tournament. Not in any way their fault, they will be feted again before kick-off in Brazil.
Standing back, Germany's revolutionary trajectory was set upon a less dramatic curve than Spain's. As such their point of plateau is lower. Prior to La Roja's breakthrough the question for the Spanish was why such clearly talented players were failing to make significant headway as a group at elite tournament level. Germany's challenge was more to do with changing individual style: from World Cup winning efficiency, robustness and hard-running tactical functionality to a more subtle, athletically mobile and stylish movement and link-up. Both have achieved their aims in style, it is just that Germany's blueprint now requires more talented players in more positions, allied to greater squad depth. What must not be forgotten regarding Germany is how relatively quickly they have advanced their younger players into the tournament mix, with a significant number of key players involved at Euro 2012 being around 23 or younger: for example Ozil, Gotze, Reus, Muller, Bender, Boateng, Schurrle. A greater surety of purpose and a stronger mentality can be expected form Die Nationalmannschaft as their talented group gains further experience. Tactically and individually, however, one of Germany's biggest problems has been developing a truly world class striker, a pressing issue not least given how a similar issue proved only a minor hurdle for Spain at Euro 2012.
Germany's problem in this position affects their overall team strength because both Miroslav Klose and Mario Gomez do not contribute greatly to their patterns of play. They are both (Klose now nearing retirement) exemplary finishers of chances created for them but at elite international level they are marked with near perfect positioning and concentration. With the front players receiving less of the ball than in the early stages of tournaments they are required to work even harder to compensate for the lack of involvement of their central striker in their transitional and approach plays. Nor does either striker possess the explosive individual ability of, for example, Brazil's legendary Ronaldo particularly outside the penalty area. As the spaces become closed down more naturally, more intensely, more cleverly so the impact of strikers who are not as potent in creating for themselves or others diminishes. With the most forward threat nullified (exceptional pace to run in behind the lines is another missing element) so elite teams can condense the space in which the attacking trio operating behind the main striker are able to express their talent. The options, channels, avenues, angles, the whole attacking set-up becomes nullified and greater pressure is placed on a defence that is often caught out both positionally and, at times, in terms of pace. Del Bosque, on behalf of his own side, has referred quite bluntly to this scenario: why play a striker who participates barely at all or only infrequently in the patterns of play of the team, he asked. His answer was to not play a striker at all, making perfect sense at the level La Roja had attained.
Germany still create chances in big games, of course, it is just that they are much less frequent and require greater precision at greater pace. A good example is to refresh the memory with the highlights of their 1-0 defeat to Spain in South Africa. Germany created only one clear chance, beautifully worked, but which fell perhaps to the wrong man and the shot was struck centrally and easily saved (Kroos, second half). The somewhat ethereal contention is that Germany will 'always improve', will 'always be stronger' and have an 'amazing squad' to call upon but if that was accurate the unsettling question that always forgoes an answer in such discussions is why did they not progress from South Africa and surrender so tamely to Italy in Warsaw.
PLAYERS
Germany 1 - 2 Italy
01 - Neuer
05 - Hummels
14 - Badstuber
16 - Lahm
20 - Boateng (Mueller - 71')
06 - Khedira
07 - Schweinsteiger
08 - Ozil
18 - Kroos
10 - Podolski (Reus - 46')
23 - Gomez (Klose - 46')
Substitutes
12 - Wiese
22 - Zieler
03 - Schmelzer
04 - Howedes
17 - Mertesacker
02 - Gundogan
09 - Schurrle
13 - Mueller
15 - Bender
19 - Gotze
21 - Reus
11 - Klose
The depth of talent at this time was insufficient, particularly defensively; yet it is questionable how much more development is likely to be forthcoming prior to Brazil. It is true that Kroos was a surprising selection but most of the representatives of the totemic youth revolution were not rated highly enough at this stage to begin the match: Muller (who scored the opening goal in Germany's 4-0 victory over Argentina in South Africa 2010, below), Schurrle, Gotze, Bender, Reus. This laid bare the tactical inefficiency of a current International team competing at elite tournament level based on an advanced league football model: bordering on devastating in club league competitions, against poor international teams such as England (4-1) and disorganised international teams such as Argentina under Maradona (4-0):
The fourth goal is very similar to the one that fell to Kroos v Spain in the Euro 2012 semi-final. Here, with the match comfortably won (mentality), the chance was directed into the goal smoothly by Klose. As against England, whom they outclassed, Argentina were exposed owing to their positional and tactical deficiencies under Maradona although it was much closer than the scoreline suggests until the second goal was scored. The point of plateau, however, is made all the more obvious given how nearly all of the players involved in this 'rout' played two years later in the defeat against Italy (although there is no doubt that the overall pool of individual German talent was much stronger by this point). The problem is that the best 'revolution' players (including Gundogan) are almost exclusively midfielders/forwards and not world class defenders or a striker (Mario Gomez, for example, is leaving the Champions League Winners Bayern Munich in 2013). Germany's international plateau crystallises around the philosophical approach favoured by the Deutscher Fussball-Bund (DFB). In short, it favoured a (successful) overhaul and restructuring of the socio-economic redevelopment of the Bundesliga through which the national team would benefit. This therefore had some clearly discernible and rewarding impact on the structure of the national team but, unlike in Spain, it was not decisive. Germany revolutionised their league and core playing style; Spain revolutionised in its entirety what it takes to win an International football competition.
Managerial Stability, Tactical Improvements
The question to answer for Germany is who will score the goals against the elite teams in elite situations. Despite being obvious, it is unlikely to be their best player, Mesut Ozil, because he is their creator supreme. In La Liga for Real Madrid in the 2012/13 season, he assisted thirteen of Real Madrid's goals (Iniesta sixteen for Barcelona). Whilst his natural ability means he is a threat in any central position he tends to drift into the wider zones, not unlike Iniesta although Iniesta's starting position is (often) naturally wider. Because their national teams' patterns of play are different, Ozil would really benefit from a more dynamic form of striker in terms of link-up and also acceleration to stretch defenders away affording him more space. In that respect Mario Gotze may well be essential to Germany's future. His record-breaking transfer to Bayern Munich (replacing Gomez) together with new manager Pep Guardiola's proven tactical approach, suggests he may play something akin to the role of Messi for Barcelona or (at times) Febregas for Spain. Whisper it: Germany's most powerful club side may yet adapt a False-9 pattern of play. But would Germany, specifically Joachim Low, do likewise?
The article highlighted here is a thought-provoking assessment based on a comparative between club and country. It leans towards an analysis of one key individual (Joachim Low) rather than the whole process of flow, development and change. Many points in the article require further clarification (forthcoming in the comments section) and one or two are dubious but one of the 'comments' raises one of the key points made here about the kind of player Germany has produced an abundance of: "There is one important thing. From Bayern and Dortmund, Jogi Loew have a strong layers of player but only in midfield. Do not forget. that for central defenders, it is only Mats Hummels who I think perform good enough. If player like Dante and David Alaba play for Germany, the story can be a lot different. Same story for the front, it will take a whole different story if Lewandowski play for Germany" [sic]. Without making the point explicitly, the article on the whole tends in the same direction as here: the tactical and philosophical revolution crashes to an extent because the German approach is not all-encompassing. The talent is not evenly spread to the attack and defence and, unlike the case with Spain, the tactical set-up of the team (including possession retention and retrieval at elite level) is insufficient to cover those weaknesses in personnel. For Spain, in contrast, any such weaknesses are protected by their tactical and philosophical commitment to tiki-taka, which houses an in-built defensive structure. In fairness to Low, he has never shied from openly stating his preference for a strong attacking strategy. The article's timing was premature of course - symptomatic of the hype and skewed analysis often accompanying talk of the German national team - but the openness is clear-cut from the current manager. What catches the eye is his reference to covering rectangles (key areas of the pitch) whereas the core of tiki-taka, the old pass-and-move, or whatever, is based on triangles; (Low said): "It’s about order on the pitch. That is the most important condition for good football. The players should know their place in the basic structure of the team, so that no-one thinks he can run all over the pitch. Certain rectangles must always be covered". Quite possibly, Germany's revolutionary players are constrained by the rigidity of the national team's mentality, its overarching philosophy.
Analytically, Germany's arrested process of developmental plateau is of a structured self-regulated kind. This means subsequent change and development resides in their own hands, under their own influence, whereas for a team like England no such options exist. Contrary to the Spanish and German models England have no philosophy, no pattern of play, no commitment to talent development, no desire to learn the finest intricacies required for elite level competition. With Germany the contradiction that for so many people is unresolvable in their own minds lies in looking in singular, isolated fashion at a squad-sheet of names: extraordinarily promising and in some cases already accomplished players leap off the page; they play for top European sides, many in the Bundesliga; the Bundesliga captured the Champions League Final; Germany - those players - overwhelm most teams, only for the final output at the most crucial time to stall and stutter and retreat. Without managerial and tactical developments the pattern will repeat in Brazil, so Guardiola's appointment at Bayern will be interesting given he is the first Spaniard to manage a Bundesliga team.
Expectation
At elite level it is extremely rare for rapid improvement to come from left-field; it is almost always well signposted. The last 'unexpected team' to reach a World Cup Final was either Czechoslovakia in 1962 (lost 3-1 to Brazil in Chile) or England (beat West Germany 4-2 in England). Since then the same countries have reappeared in the final: residual class outs. From South America Brazil have won three and been beaten finalists in another; Argentina have won two and been beaten finalists in another. From Europe (West) Germany have shared elite status with Italy, France and only recently Spain. Holland have been beaten finalists three times. If at the moment we consider France to be lacking in elite strength and Holland to be exciting, capable but also unreliable, that leaves five of the usual suspects jostling for a shoot-out at the Maracana.
Given that Germany are priced as being Spain's equals for both the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Euro Championships it would suggest that there is evidence that Spain's pool of talent is in decline, or that Germany's pool of talent and philosophy is advancing significantly, or both. Analytically, the reverse is true. At the 2013 Under-21 Championships in Israel, Germany exited at the group stage (conceding in all three games) losing to Holland and, whisper the word 'inevitably', 1-0 to Spain. La Rojita swept all before them winning the tournament in a canter, confirming a pool of talent quite unimaginable to other nations. Germany had won the Euro U21's in 2009 (beating England U21 4-0) but they did not qualify for the tournament in 2011, which Spain won, and were unimpressive in 2013. It is therefore difficult to imagine where further strength will emerge from for the full national side, another clear indication that developing the existing pool of talent within a different tactical structure is essential prior to Brazil.
The current national team lacks streetwise tournament knowledge. They are perhaps unfortunate to have collided twice with the apotheosis of tournament efficiency and ruthlessness but, Spain aside, the loss to Italy showed quite starkly how and why their progress stalled. Whether Low is the right man to advance Germany's pattern of play is questionable. The hallmarks of his side are a success in general terms and there is no need to banish their physically explosive style. That style, however, along with the mentality that drives it requires much greater focus on defensive shape and ball retention. Those fundamental aspects are tightly interwoven with Germany's insistance on using a striker that contributes only marginally to patterns of play against elite teams. Spain solved their 'striker problem' quite brilliantly; can Germany do the same? If they do, they will be a force at elite level once again.
Germany's problem in this position affects their overall team strength because both Miroslav Klose and Mario Gomez do not contribute greatly to their patterns of play. They are both (Klose now nearing retirement) exemplary finishers of chances created for them but at elite international level they are marked with near perfect positioning and concentration. With the front players receiving less of the ball than in the early stages of tournaments they are required to work even harder to compensate for the lack of involvement of their central striker in their transitional and approach plays. Nor does either striker possess the explosive individual ability of, for example, Brazil's legendary Ronaldo particularly outside the penalty area. As the spaces become closed down more naturally, more intensely, more cleverly so the impact of strikers who are not as potent in creating for themselves or others diminishes. With the most forward threat nullified (exceptional pace to run in behind the lines is another missing element) so elite teams can condense the space in which the attacking trio operating behind the main striker are able to express their talent. The options, channels, avenues, angles, the whole attacking set-up becomes nullified and greater pressure is placed on a defence that is often caught out both positionally and, at times, in terms of pace. Del Bosque, on behalf of his own side, has referred quite bluntly to this scenario: why play a striker who participates barely at all or only infrequently in the patterns of play of the team, he asked. His answer was to not play a striker at all, making perfect sense at the level La Roja had attained.
Germany still create chances in big games, of course, it is just that they are much less frequent and require greater precision at greater pace. A good example is to refresh the memory with the highlights of their 1-0 defeat to Spain in South Africa. Germany created only one clear chance, beautifully worked, but which fell perhaps to the wrong man and the shot was struck centrally and easily saved (Kroos, second half). The somewhat ethereal contention is that Germany will 'always improve', will 'always be stronger' and have an 'amazing squad' to call upon but if that was accurate the unsettling question that always forgoes an answer in such discussions is why did they not progress from South Africa and surrender so tamely to Italy in Warsaw.
PLAYERS
Germany 1 - 2 Italy
01 - Neuer
05 - Hummels
14 - Badstuber
16 - Lahm
20 - Boateng (Mueller - 71')
06 - Khedira
07 - Schweinsteiger
08 - Ozil
18 - Kroos
10 - Podolski (Reus - 46')
23 - Gomez (Klose - 46')
Substitutes
12 - Wiese
22 - Zieler
03 - Schmelzer
04 - Howedes
17 - Mertesacker
02 - Gundogan
09 - Schurrle
13 - Mueller
15 - Bender
19 - Gotze
21 - Reus
11 - Klose
The depth of talent at this time was insufficient, particularly defensively; yet it is questionable how much more development is likely to be forthcoming prior to Brazil. It is true that Kroos was a surprising selection but most of the representatives of the totemic youth revolution were not rated highly enough at this stage to begin the match: Muller (who scored the opening goal in Germany's 4-0 victory over Argentina in South Africa 2010, below), Schurrle, Gotze, Bender, Reus. This laid bare the tactical inefficiency of a current International team competing at elite tournament level based on an advanced league football model: bordering on devastating in club league competitions, against poor international teams such as England (4-1) and disorganised international teams such as Argentina under Maradona (4-0):
The fourth goal is very similar to the one that fell to Kroos v Spain in the Euro 2012 semi-final. Here, with the match comfortably won (mentality), the chance was directed into the goal smoothly by Klose. As against England, whom they outclassed, Argentina were exposed owing to their positional and tactical deficiencies under Maradona although it was much closer than the scoreline suggests until the second goal was scored. The point of plateau, however, is made all the more obvious given how nearly all of the players involved in this 'rout' played two years later in the defeat against Italy (although there is no doubt that the overall pool of individual German talent was much stronger by this point). The problem is that the best 'revolution' players (including Gundogan) are almost exclusively midfielders/forwards and not world class defenders or a striker (Mario Gomez, for example, is leaving the Champions League Winners Bayern Munich in 2013). Germany's international plateau crystallises around the philosophical approach favoured by the Deutscher Fussball-Bund (DFB). In short, it favoured a (successful) overhaul and restructuring of the socio-economic redevelopment of the Bundesliga through which the national team would benefit. This therefore had some clearly discernible and rewarding impact on the structure of the national team but, unlike in Spain, it was not decisive. Germany revolutionised their league and core playing style; Spain revolutionised in its entirety what it takes to win an International football competition.
Managerial Stability, Tactical Improvements
The question to answer for Germany is who will score the goals against the elite teams in elite situations. Despite being obvious, it is unlikely to be their best player, Mesut Ozil, because he is their creator supreme. In La Liga for Real Madrid in the 2012/13 season, he assisted thirteen of Real Madrid's goals (Iniesta sixteen for Barcelona). Whilst his natural ability means he is a threat in any central position he tends to drift into the wider zones, not unlike Iniesta although Iniesta's starting position is (often) naturally wider. Because their national teams' patterns of play are different, Ozil would really benefit from a more dynamic form of striker in terms of link-up and also acceleration to stretch defenders away affording him more space. In that respect Mario Gotze may well be essential to Germany's future. His record-breaking transfer to Bayern Munich (replacing Gomez) together with new manager Pep Guardiola's proven tactical approach, suggests he may play something akin to the role of Messi for Barcelona or (at times) Febregas for Spain. Whisper it: Germany's most powerful club side may yet adapt a False-9 pattern of play. But would Germany, specifically Joachim Low, do likewise?
The article highlighted here is a thought-provoking assessment based on a comparative between club and country. It leans towards an analysis of one key individual (Joachim Low) rather than the whole process of flow, development and change. Many points in the article require further clarification (forthcoming in the comments section) and one or two are dubious but one of the 'comments' raises one of the key points made here about the kind of player Germany has produced an abundance of: "There is one important thing. From Bayern and Dortmund, Jogi Loew have a strong layers of player but only in midfield. Do not forget. that for central defenders, it is only Mats Hummels who I think perform good enough. If player like Dante and David Alaba play for Germany, the story can be a lot different. Same story for the front, it will take a whole different story if Lewandowski play for Germany" [sic]. Without making the point explicitly, the article on the whole tends in the same direction as here: the tactical and philosophical revolution crashes to an extent because the German approach is not all-encompassing. The talent is not evenly spread to the attack and defence and, unlike the case with Spain, the tactical set-up of the team (including possession retention and retrieval at elite level) is insufficient to cover those weaknesses in personnel. For Spain, in contrast, any such weaknesses are protected by their tactical and philosophical commitment to tiki-taka, which houses an in-built defensive structure. In fairness to Low, he has never shied from openly stating his preference for a strong attacking strategy. The article's timing was premature of course - symptomatic of the hype and skewed analysis often accompanying talk of the German national team - but the openness is clear-cut from the current manager. What catches the eye is his reference to covering rectangles (key areas of the pitch) whereas the core of tiki-taka, the old pass-and-move, or whatever, is based on triangles; (Low said): "It’s about order on the pitch. That is the most important condition for good football. The players should know their place in the basic structure of the team, so that no-one thinks he can run all over the pitch. Certain rectangles must always be covered". Quite possibly, Germany's revolutionary players are constrained by the rigidity of the national team's mentality, its overarching philosophy.
Analytically, Germany's arrested process of developmental plateau is of a structured self-regulated kind. This means subsequent change and development resides in their own hands, under their own influence, whereas for a team like England no such options exist. Contrary to the Spanish and German models England have no philosophy, no pattern of play, no commitment to talent development, no desire to learn the finest intricacies required for elite level competition. With Germany the contradiction that for so many people is unresolvable in their own minds lies in looking in singular, isolated fashion at a squad-sheet of names: extraordinarily promising and in some cases already accomplished players leap off the page; they play for top European sides, many in the Bundesliga; the Bundesliga captured the Champions League Final; Germany - those players - overwhelm most teams, only for the final output at the most crucial time to stall and stutter and retreat. Without managerial and tactical developments the pattern will repeat in Brazil, so Guardiola's appointment at Bayern will be interesting given he is the first Spaniard to manage a Bundesliga team.
Expectation
At elite level it is extremely rare for rapid improvement to come from left-field; it is almost always well signposted. The last 'unexpected team' to reach a World Cup Final was either Czechoslovakia in 1962 (lost 3-1 to Brazil in Chile) or England (beat West Germany 4-2 in England). Since then the same countries have reappeared in the final: residual class outs. From South America Brazil have won three and been beaten finalists in another; Argentina have won two and been beaten finalists in another. From Europe (West) Germany have shared elite status with Italy, France and only recently Spain. Holland have been beaten finalists three times. If at the moment we consider France to be lacking in elite strength and Holland to be exciting, capable but also unreliable, that leaves five of the usual suspects jostling for a shoot-out at the Maracana.
Given that Germany are priced as being Spain's equals for both the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Euro Championships it would suggest that there is evidence that Spain's pool of talent is in decline, or that Germany's pool of talent and philosophy is advancing significantly, or both. Analytically, the reverse is true. At the 2013 Under-21 Championships in Israel, Germany exited at the group stage (conceding in all three games) losing to Holland and, whisper the word 'inevitably', 1-0 to Spain. La Rojita swept all before them winning the tournament in a canter, confirming a pool of talent quite unimaginable to other nations. Germany had won the Euro U21's in 2009 (beating England U21 4-0) but they did not qualify for the tournament in 2011, which Spain won, and were unimpressive in 2013. It is therefore difficult to imagine where further strength will emerge from for the full national side, another clear indication that developing the existing pool of talent within a different tactical structure is essential prior to Brazil.
The current national team lacks streetwise tournament knowledge. They are perhaps unfortunate to have collided twice with the apotheosis of tournament efficiency and ruthlessness but, Spain aside, the loss to Italy showed quite starkly how and why their progress stalled. Whether Low is the right man to advance Germany's pattern of play is questionable. The hallmarks of his side are a success in general terms and there is no need to banish their physically explosive style. That style, however, along with the mentality that drives it requires much greater focus on defensive shape and ball retention. Those fundamental aspects are tightly interwoven with Germany's insistance on using a striker that contributes only marginally to patterns of play against elite teams. Spain solved their 'striker problem' quite brilliantly; can Germany do the same? If they do, they will be a force at elite level once again.
